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On June 24, 2005, the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice entered into a consent decree enjoining an insurance group,
the Professional Consultants Insurance Company (PCIC), from shar-
ing information about limitation of liability contract terms used by its
members.' PCIC provides insurance against errors and omissions for
its three owners, all actuarial companies that design corporate em-
ployee benefits packages.2 Responding to a series of large industry-
wide claims, many actuarial insurers, including PCIC, began experi-
menting with limitation of liability contract provisions to reduce expo-
sure.3 PCIC shared information about the benefits of limitation of li-
ability terms and future plans for implementation at an industry trade
conference.4 Adoption of the terms was described as an industry "best
practice."5 Many companies incorporated highly similar provisions
into their insurance contracts soon after.6 The Antitrust Division al-
leged that PCIC's dissemination of "competitively sensitive informa-
tion" violated § 1 of the Sherman Act;7 by sharing information about
one feature of otherwise independent insurance products, insurers reduce
the "potential for losing clients to firms not using [limitation of liabil-
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I See Complaint, United States v Professional Consultants Insurance Co, Inc, Civil Action No
05-01272, *5-9 (D DC filed June 24, 2005), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f209700/
209728.pdf (visited June 7,2006) ("Complaint"); Amended Final Judgment, United States v Profes-
sional Consultants Insurance Co, Inc, Civil No 1:05CV01272 (D DC filed Nov 26, 2005) online at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f209800/209839.pdf (visited June 7,2006) ("Consent Decree").
2 See Complaint at 2 (cited in note 1).
3 See id at 99.
4 See id at 15.
5 Id at I 15(a).
6 See id at 17 ("The sharing of this information eliminated or reduced competitive
uncertainties and concerns about the potential for losing clients to firms not using [limitation of
liability (LOL)], and thus facilitated decisions of PCIC members and other competitors to begin
implementing LOL.").
7 Id at 19. See also 15 USC § 1 (2000) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.").
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ity]."8 But neither the Consent Decree nor courts have answered whether
and when sharing information about product quality violates § 1.
This Comment argues that the best interpretation of existing case
law indicates that sharing product quality information9 should be irrebut-
tably presumed legal under § 1. Part I examines existing cases. Sharing
information, without more, does not currently violate § 1. Past courts
have treated information sharing as only one piece of evidence in a
larger inquiry into (a) price fixing and (b) quality standardization.
Price fixing is a per se violation of § 1.10 In markets with significant
quality-oriented competition, standardizing product quality can also
violate § 1.11 But sharing information about product quality is several
evidentiary steps removed from both of these § 1 offenses. More pro-
bative evidence is frequently available. Meanwhile, many significant
procompetitive effects may justify the data exchange. Part II discusses
how sharing product quality information invigorates price competi-
tion, promotes efficiency by reducing socially costly "price dispersion,"
and enables procompetitive benchmarking.
Part III explains why courts should apply an irrebuttable presump-
tion of § 1 legality for product quality information sharing. In evaluating
the legality of sharing information about product quality as a precur-
sor to § 1 violations, courts are ill-equipped to make fine distinctions
between the anticompetitive and procompetitive case. Moreover, the
cost of error is greater for the false positive than the false negative case.
The former may deter competitively vital behavior, while the latter only
takes away information sharing as evidence of other § 1 violations-
the harm is small precisely because product quality information shar-
ing can facilitate either competition or tacit agreement, and should
therefore not be considered evidence of either. Thus, this situation fits
the prototypical case in which evidence scholars have argued that a
presumption of legality is warranted.12
Part IV applies the foregoing analysis to the recent PCIC decree.
The Antitrust Division's allegation that PCIC violated § 1 by sharing
8 Complaint at 117 (cited in note 1).
9 For the purpose of this analysis, product quality is defined roughly as any nonprice term.
10 See United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US 150, 218 (1940) ("[Tjhis Court has
consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlaw-
ful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils
which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense.").
11 See United States v First National Pictures, Inc, 282 US 44, 54-55 (1930) (holding that
standardizing contract provisions violated § 1 when significant quality competition existed be-
forehand); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp v United States, 282 US 30,43-44 (1930) (same).
12 See Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidence for Ad-
verse Decisions, 25 J Legal Stud 27, 34 (1996) (demonstrating that legal presumptions vary by
context depending on the greater of costs of error for the false positive or the false negative
case).
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information about insurance products seems incorrect. Well-established
case law makes clear that information sharing is never an independent
§ 1 violation. The Complaint could have been modified to allege in-
stead that PCIC violated § 1 not by sharing information but by conspir-
ing with competitors to standardize product quality. Although plausible,
the Complaint alleges insufficient facts under that theory as well.
Even if standardizing the insurance contracts was itself anticompeti-
tive, it should have produced offsetting procompetitive effects. Most
important, information sharing would be relatively weak evidence of
illegal standardization when compared with other facts probably
available, such as competitor adoption of identical terms at a single
point in time. Yet the PCIC decree may be explained by the fact that
even though information sharing is itself legal, decrees may enjoin
otherwise legal behavior as a prophylactic measure to "ensure that the
violation will cease and competition will be restored." 3
I. SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT QUALITY AS
EVIDENCE OF PRICE FIXING OR QUALITY STANDARDIZATION
This Part demonstrates that sharing information about product
quality is not an independent violation of § 1; it is only evidence of
price fixing or quality standardization. Part L.A gives a primer to § 1
and defines economic competition. Parts I.B and I.C show that sharing
product quality information is typically weak evidence of both price
fixing and quality standardization.
A. "Competition" and § 1 Defined
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that, "Every contract ... or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States
... is declared to be illegal.' 4 Thus, § 1 forbids cooperative activity that
reduces competition. "Competition" is a measurement of market suc-
cess in producing Pareto-efficient transactions; 5 that is, connecting
goods and services with buyers who value them more than the mar-
ginal cost of production. 6 Put another way, competition is a measure
13 Toys "R" Us Inc v FTC, 221 F3d 928,940 (7th Cir 2000).
14 15 USC § 1.
15 Pareto-efficient transactions are those that make at least one transacting party better off,
while making the other party no worse off. For a general discussion, see Louis Kaplow and Ste-
ven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive
Justice, 32 J Legal Stud 331,342-51 (2003) (analyzing social policies for Pareto optimality).
16 See Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, 1 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Anti-
trust Principles and Their Application I 100a at 3 (Aspen 2d ed 2000) ("[O]ptimal competition
occurs when the firms in a market price their output at marginal cost and costs are minimized by
internal efficiency, research and development, and attainment of economies of scale.").
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of market output.17 In competitive markets, a product's price ap-
proaches the marginal cost of production; every buyer who values the
good for more buys it and consumer welfare (the basic value pro-
moted by antitrust law'8) is maximized. Anticompetitive conduct, in
turn, is any behavior that reduces market output.'9 Collectively raising
prices above marginal cost or limiting production are two common
ways competition is reduced. But any concerted reduction in output
violates § 1.20
Some forms of cooperative behavior, such as price fixing, are per se
§ 1 violations. Such categories of behavior have been adjudged "strict
liability" offenses because they almost always reduce market output.
21
But not every competition-reducing activity is illegal under § 1. Most
firm behavior is reviewed under the so-called rule of reason rather
than under a per se § 1 analysis because the behavior produces some
competition-enhancing effects and other competition-reducing ones.22
To determine liability then, courts perform a competitive cost-benefit
analysis to assess a behavior's net competitive effect.'
B. Sharing Information about Product Quality as Evidence of
Price Fixing
Price information sharing cases offer a framework to examine
the § 1 legality of sharing information about product quality. The le-
gality of firms sharing information about price can be measured solely
by its strength as evidence of price fixing.24 Information sharing is
17 Market output is simply the number of goods sold. See id.To reduce market output is to
reduce competition. To enhance the former is to enhance the latter. See E. Thomas Sullivan, On
Nonprice Competition:An Economic and Marketing Analysis, 45 U Pitt L Rev 771,798 (1984).
18 See Areeda and Hovenkamp, 1 Antitrust Law I 100a at 4 (cited in note 16) ("[T]he
principal objective of antitrust policy is to maximize consumer welfare by encouraging firms to
behave competitively.").
19 See id I 100a at 3-4 ("[T]he best measure of competition is equilibrium output. Thus a
market with three sellers but an output of 100 units per day is more competitive than one with
ten sellers but an output of only 80 units per day.").
20 See Sullivan, 45 U Pitt L Rev at 787 (cited in note 17) ("The best measure of competi-
tion is whether total output is restricted, for output restriction is the core of cartel behavior.").
21 See Northern Pacific Railway Co v United States, 356 US 1, 5 (1958) ("[T]here are cer-
tain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal.").
22 See, for example, Broadcast Music, Inc v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, 441 US 1,
24 (1979) (remanding a case for the trial court to conduct a rule of reason analysis).
23 See id at 8 n 11 (describing rule of reason analysis as "an incredibly complicated and pro-
longed economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related
industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable").
24 See Richard A. Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and Engi-
neers Decisions, 67 Georgetown L J 1187,1197-99 (1978) (arguing that sharing price information
should only be evidence of price fixing rather than an independent offense).
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never an independent offense,' let alone illegal per se.26 That is to say,
it is well established that taken alone, without evidence of an independ-
ent agreement in restraint of trade, sharing price information does not
violate § 1.
Two cases guide the Court's current approach in examining price
information sharing under § 1. In factually similar cases decided four
years apart, the Court held sharing information about price illegal in
American Column & Lumber Co v United States27 but legal in Maple
Flooring Manufacturers Association v United States.28
In American Column, a trade association of 365 competing hard-
wood manufacturers made up more than one-third of the national
market.29 The association's constituency implemented a comprehensive
program of sharing information about "sales, prices, production, and
practices."' Separate from the information sharing, the Court found
evidence of an agreement to collectively reduce production in (a)
meeting transcripts," (b) joint price and production forecasts, 32 and (c)
extraordinary increases in market prices after the alleged agreement.33
The Court held this agreement dispositive of § 1 illegality.
The Court reached the opposite conclusion in Maple Flooring.
That case involved an association of wood flooring manufacturers and
shippers that constituted 74.2 percent of the national market.34 De-
tailed information was exchanged about (a) average costs of produc-
tion, and (b) shipping rates from Cadillac, Michigan, to all other points
in the nation.5 The allegation then was that the average cost plus the
basing-point shipping rate fixed a minimum price charged by each
25 See Sugar Institute, Inc v United States, 297 US 553,598 (1936).
26 See United States v Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 US 86,113 (1975).
27 257 US 377 (1921).
28 268 US 563 (1925).
29 See 257 US at 391,410.
30 Id at 394-96. Price and production information was exchanged and "subdivided as to
grade, kind, [and] thickness" Id at 395.
31 See id at 402-03, 406-07. For example, one member of the trade association is docu-
mented to have stated at a meeting that "[o]verproduction has always been the curse of the
lumber industry in America. It has caused more trouble and hardship than any other one factor.
It would be criminal folly, therefore, for the lumber manufacturers to indulge themselves in any
such form of commercial suicide." Id at 403.
32 See id at 403, 410. The association jointly employed an analyst to create price and pro-
duction forecasts. The Court found that this "single interpreter of their common purposes" was
evidence of a tacit understanding among the producers. See id at 411.
33 See id at 409 (noting that oak prices increased anywhere from 33.3 to 296 percent; gum
from 60 to 343 percent: ash from 55 to 181 percent).
34 See Maple Flooring, 268 US at 566 (holding that trade associations could lawfully dis-
seminate information about their product so long as no agreement existed regarding their prices
or production).
35 See id at 566-67.
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competitor.3 6 The government, unable to prove the existence of an
actual agreement, sought to enjoin the information sharing as "neces-
sarily arbitrary and [possibly] a cover for price fixing. 37 But the Court
concluded that, although the information exchange demonstrated an
opportunity for agreement on price or production, none was executed
in fact." The Court emphasized three pieces of evidence that no agree-
ment had taken place. First, the information exchanged was made
publicly available and read by up to 95 percent of the defendants'
buyers.39 Second, no actual uniformity in prices resulted: individual
firm prices still fluctuated with supply and demand.40 Third, the asso-
ciation persuasively argued that it shared the data for the procompeti-
tive purpose of reducing price dispersion. 1
The distinction between these two cases turns on the existence of
an agreement to reduce output in the former but not in the latter. Nei-
ther information sharing itself nor the nature of the information traded
(whether public or private, current or historical, individuated or ag-
gregated) was crucial in either case. 2 The Maple Flooring Court em-
phasized the fact that the information in that case was read by both
buyers and sellers, making it an unlikely device for covert action.4'3 But
the American Column Court expressed skepticism that simply "be-
cause the meetings were nominally open to the public, or because sev-
36 See id at 572. Under basing-point freight pricing, each seller has a "natural freight ad-
vantage territory" -shipments close to the manufacturer cost less to deliver. The seller agrees
not to exclude competition by reducing price, instead inviting others "to share the available
business at matched prices in his natural market." Triangle Conduit & Cable Co v FTC, 168 F2d
175, 181 (7th Cir 1948). In exchange, the seller receives a reciprocal invitation into other distant
markets Id. See also Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 91-93 (Chicago 2d ed 2001) (concluding that
basing point pricing systems indicate the existence of a price cartel); Richard A. Posner and Frank
H. Easterbrook, Antitrust- Cases Economic Notes and Other Materials 345-46 (West 1981) (same).
37 Maple Flooring, 268 US at 570.
38 Id at 575.
39 See id at 573-74. According to the Court:
[The information shared did not] differ in any essential respect from trade or business sta-
tistics which are freely gathered and publicly disseminated in numerous branches of indus-
try producing a standardized product ... whose statistics disclose volume and material ele-
ments affecting costs of production, sales price, and stock on hand.
Id at 574.
40 See id at 567-68.
41 See id at 582-84. Price dispersion is the variance in market prices from the efficient
price. Thus, reducing price dispersion sets market prices closer to the efficient price. For a thor-
ough exposition of price dispersion, see Part lI.B.
42 See American Column, 257 US at 407 (holding that trade meeting statements, joint price
forecasts, and actual uniformity in prices produced a "concert of action" between the producers
to reduce supply); Maple Flooring, 268 US at 575 ("The government, however, does not charge,
nor is it contended, that there was any understanding or agreement, either express or implied, at
the meetings or elsewhere, with respect to prices.").
43 See 268 US at 574.
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eral voluminous reports were transmitted to the Department of Jus-
tice," no covert use of the information was possible."
Thus, as illustrated, courts treat price information sharing as cir-
cumstantial evidence of opportunity for agreement on price.4' Infor-
mation sharing has fallen in with a larger set of other contextual fac-
tors that courts look to when determining whether parties have
formed an agreement. These factors include, among others, seller con-
centration, historically anticompetitive tendencies, and inelastic de-
mand.' Courts place more emphasis on direct evidence of anticom-
petitive effect (such as anticompetitive intent or actual agreement)
than these contextual signals. 7 But courts may be willing to base liabil-
ity on circumstantial evidence alone when tacit coordination among
competitors is particularly likely but proving that agreement especially
difficult.48 The use of circumstantial evidence in this way is not unique
to antitrust law, but rather a common evidentiary technique. 9
There are three common forms of evidence that a cartel is in
place. First, means among alleged conspirators to monitor compliance
with an agreement is evidence of opportunity to agree. Receiving in-
formation supports an agreement only to the extent that it helps firms
predict what competitors will do. Even actual agreement is innocuous
unless firms can observe whether others have kept their end of the
44 257 US at 411. Public information is less likely to reduce competition not due to any
inherent difference with private information, but because it lacks incidental aspects of communi-
cating private information that make tacit agreement easier to achieve. Information traded in
private conceals potential mutual monitoring and punishment for breach of the agreement, both
of which are components of conspiracy unique to private information. Compare Tag Manufac-
turers Institute v FTC, 174 F2d 452, 462 (1st Cir 1949) (explaining that "secrecy more readily
suggests the inference that the agreement is inspired by some unlawful purpose and precludes
the argument that the information thus secretly exchanged serves a function similar to that of
market information made available through the activities of commodity exchanges, trade jour-
nals, etc."), with In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 906 F2d 432,447 (9th Cir 1990) ("Petroleum Products") (noting that public disclosure "does
not immunize the exchange of price information from legal sanction where the conditions of the
market suggest that the exchange promotes collusive rather than competitive pricing") (internal
quotation marks omitted), quoting Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective
147 (Chicago 1976).
45 See, for example, Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute v FTC, 152 F2d 478, 483 (7th Cir
1946) ("[Elach of the prohibited acts is directed solely at price fixing in connection with an
agreement or conspiracy. It is not a valid criticism to say that they are enjoined from the [infor-
mation sharing] mentioned when used independently or even by an agreement unrelated to the
price structure.").
46 See United States v Container Corp ofAmerica, 393 US 333,337 (1969).
47 Agreements sometimes produce paper trails. See, for example, American Column, 257
US at 402, 407 (discussing trade association meeting transcripts and memorandums as direct
evidence of a conspiracy among members to fix prices).
48 See, for example, Container Corp, 393 US at 337.
49 See generally Schauer and Zeckhauser,25 J Legal Stud 27 (cited in note 12).
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deal." Second, methods to enforce breaches of agreement also dem-
onstrate opportunity to agree. Without an enforcement mechanism,
the probability of a devastating loss in demand from a unilateral price
increase is high. A mechanism for enforcing the agreement inverts this
risk profile. The probability of loss in demand due to a unilateral price
increase is significantly reduced; at the same time, the probability of
loss through competitor retribution for breach becomes almost certain.51
Third, behavior that would be irrational in the absence of an agreement
(for example, increasing prices in a climate of decreasing costs) is also
strong evidence of cartel action. Prices should fluctuate with supply,
demand, and costs of production. Changes in price should also have eco-
nomic explanations. The absence of either is evidence of conspiracy.s2
All evidence taken together must show that an agreement existed
in fact, because § 1 forbids concerted action but not parallel behavior
that is not the result of an agreement. 3 Some commentators have sug-
gested that in concentrated markets where anticompetitive conse-
quences are particularly likely, § 1 liability may be predicated solely
upon information sharing even without an underlying agreement.4 But
removing the agreement requirement ignores the plain language of §
50 See American Column, 257 US at 411 (finding that a price information sharing program
created a mechanism to monitor compliance with the existing agreement to fix prices).
51 See, for example, Cement Institute, 333 US at 730 (discussing evidence that cartelists had
the means to, and did in fact, punish recalcitrants).
52 See Triangle Conduit, 168 F2d at 179 (holding that price uniformity without an explain-
able relationship to supply and demand is evidence of an agreement). See also Lawrence An-
thony Sullivan, Handbook of the Law ofAntitrust 272 (West 1977).
53 See United States v International Harvester Co, 274 US 693, 708-09 (1927) ("[T]he fact
that competitors may see proper, in the exercise of their own judgment, to follow the prices of
another manufacturer, does not establish any suppression of competition or show any sinister
domination."); Petroleum Products, 906 F2d at 444 ("We recognize that interdependent pricing
may often produce economic consequences that are comparable to those of classic cartels. None-
theless, proof of such pricing, standing alone, is generally considered insufficient to establish a
violation of the Sherman Act."). See also Clamp-All Corp v Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute, 851 F2d
478, 484 (1st Cir 1988) (same); Pevely Dairy Co v United States, 178 F2d 363, 368 (8th Cir 1949)
(same).
54 See, for example, Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust at 703 (cited in note 52)
(interpreting Container Corp as standing for the proposition that in some markets information
exchange can violate § 1 by affecting the level of prices, even without actual agreement). Other
commentators disagree, arguing that information sharing should only be considered evidence of
price fixing. See Posner, 67 Georgetown L J at 1197-98 (cited in note 24) ("[A]n agreement
simply to exchange price information should not be regarded as a violation of the antitrust laws
Such an agreement should only be admissible as evidence of an agreement to fix prices, which
would be, in my view, unlawful whether express or tacit."). See also Container Corp, 393 US at
337-38. The Court found a violation of § 1 in a market with a structure conducive to cartel for-
mation: (a) the "industry is dominated by relatively few sellers," (b) "[t]he product is fungible,"
(c) "[t]he demand is inelastic," and (d) prices actually tended toward uniformity with the infor-
mation disclosure. Id at 337. The Court accepted the evidence because actual agreement among
competitors seemed too difficult to prove. Id at 337.
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1 requiring a "contract, combination[,] ... or conspiracy.' '55 Moreover,
courts have rejected this line of reasoning, preferring only to broaden
what is evidence of an agreement rather than discard § l's "conspiracy"
requirement altogether.56 Thus, one court observed that existing cases
together "could be interpreted as saying that when the conduct or ef-
fect cannot be otherwise explained, an anticompetitive agreement can
be inferred from exchange of detailed current price information."57
Information about product quality may be used to derive price.
Knowing exactly what a competitor produces allows a more accurate
assessment of that competitor's costs of production, and correspond-
ingly the price that the competitor will charge in the marketplace. But
to the extent that information about product quality helps firms esti-
mate what competitors will charge, it poses less of an antitrust danger
than price information itself. Thus, price information sharing cases set
a sensible limit for product quality information sharing cases: as evi-
dence of fixing price, sharing product quality information should be
presumptively legal in situations in which price information sharing
has been held legal. Put another way, like price information, sharing
information about product quality should be presumptively legal taken
alone, without proof of a separate agreement to fix output. 8
C. Sharing Information about Product Quality as Evidence of Anti-
competitive Standardization
This Part examines when quality standardization may independ-
ently violate § 1. Subpart 1 explains why standardization does not vio-
late § 1 in markets for most physical products. Subpart 2 explains why
standardization may sometimes violate § 1 in markets for contract
terms as alleged in the PCIC case.
In some respects, price information is useful to firms only if it is
accompanied by information about product quality; products must be
55 See 15 USC § 1.
56 See Theatre Enterprises, Inc v Paramount Film Distributing Corp, 346 US 537,541 (1954)
("Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into
the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.").
57 Zenith Radio Corp v Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co, 513 F Supp 1100, 1153 n 65 (ED
Pa 1981), revd in part, In re Japanese Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F2d 238 (3d Cir 1983),
affd, Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co, Ltd v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574 (1986). See also
Posner, 67 Georgetown L J at 1199 (cited in note 24) (arguing that "[miarket structure becomes
relevant only when .. the existence of the agreement to exchange information provides circum-
stantial evidence of an underlying agreement to fix prices" ).
58 See Sugar Institute, 297 US at 598 ("The natural effect of the acquisition of the wider
and more scientific knowledge of business conditions ... and the subsequent stabilizing of pro-
duction and price, cannot be said to be an unreasonable restraint or in any respect unlawful.").
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comparable in quality for prices to have meaning. Information about
product quality can help firms standardize products. Whether stan-
dardization is anticompetitive and thus violates § 1 depends on whether
competition is primarily quality based to begin with. Put less ab-
stractly, whether standardization reduces net competition depends on
a tradeoff between (a) economies of scale in production (or the cost
of producing design variants),59 and (b) the level of market demand
for improvements (or the benefit of producing design variants). Both
factors can be measured according to market output. Professor Lan-
caster states the matter clearly:
If there are no economies of scale associated with individual
product variance .... then it is optimal to custom produce to eve-
ryone's chosen specification. If there is no gain from variety and
there are scale economies, then it is clearly optimal to produce
only a single variant if those economies are unlimited, or only
such variety as uses scale economies to the limit .... Most cases
involve a balance of some variety against some scale economies.
60
1. Quality standardization does not independently violate § 1
in markets for most physical products.
Markets for physical products with dominant designs6' by defini-
tion possess (a) high scale economies and (b) low market demand for
improvements. 62 With such products, standardization is typically pro-
competitive. Taking advantage of scale economies increases output by
lowering the cost of production. At the same time, standardization does
not reduce output because the market does not demand much "im-
59 Economies of scale are "factors which make it possible for larger organizations or coun-
tries to produce goods or services more cheaply than smaller ones." John Black, A Dictionary of
Economics 138 (Oxford 1997).
60 Kevin Lancaster, The Economics of Product Variety: A Survey, 9 Marketing Sci 189, 192
(2000). See also E. H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, 40 Amer Econ Rev
85,89-90 (May 1950):
The issue might be put as efficiency versus diversity-more of either one means less of the
other. But unless it can be shown that the loss of satisfaction from a more standardized
product ... is less than the gain through producing more units, there is no "waste" at all[.]
How are the two to be compared-a larger, less heterogeneous output as against a smaller,
more heterogeneous one? The price system ... appears to afford no test.
61 A dominant design is one that accounts for most of a market's demand. For the seminal
definition of the term "dominant design," see William J. Abernathy and James M. Utterback,
Patterns of Industrial Innovation, Tech Rev 40-47 (June/July 1978).
62 See Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization 286 (MIT 1988) (reviewing eco-
nomic literature that concludes that the optimal degree of product design variety is lower for
product variations that have high cross-elasticities in demand-that is, there is a single dominant
design that would benefit from economies of scale in production without a reduction in output).
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provement. 63 Simply put, standardization in these markets increases
price competition without reducing quality competition. 64 Unless there
is a separate agreement to fix prices, net competition increases. In this
setting standardization can only be evidence of price fixing; it cannot
separately violate § 1.
Compare the outcome in Tag Manufacturers Institute v FTC65 to
that in Bond Crown & Cork Co v FTC.66 In Tag Manufacturers, a trade
organization of printed label manufacturers standardized the design
of tags67 and shared price information.6' Reversing the FTC's decision,
the First Circuit allowed the information sharing and quality standardi-
zation to continue because no separate agreement had taken place to
fix prices.69 By contrast, in Bond Crown & Cork, the court held that the
"standardization of the product ... [although] innocent enough by
itself," was illegal because it was a part of a larger price fixing
scheme.7°
Similarly, in National Macaroni Manufacturers Association v FTC,71
the Seventh Circuit enjoined pasta manufacturers from standardizing
the blend of durum wheat used in pasta solely because doing so
formed a monopsony buyer cartel 72 depressing wheat prices below the
competitive level.73 Other courts have also held that product stan-
dardization in markets for physical goods with dominant designs is
only illegal to the extent that it supports a separate price cartel.74
63 That the market prefers few variants is a corollary of the assumption that some domi-
nant design exists.
64 See Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization at 286 (cited in note 62) (concluding
that the optimal degree of product design variety is low for markets in which there are econo-
mies of scale in production and a dominant design).
65 174 F2d 452 (1st Cir 1949).
66 176 F2d 974 (4th Cir 1949).
67 See 174 F2d at 453.
68 See id at 453-54.
69 See id at 463.
70 176 F2d at 979. Bond Crown & Cork involved bottle caps thoroughly standardized in
both design and price for almost ten years preceding the litigation. Id at 976.
71 345 F2d 421 (7th Cir 1965).
72 A monopsony is a "market situation in which one buyer controls the market." Black's
Law Dictionary 1028 (West 8th ed 2004). Monopsony is the opposite of monopoly, which is a
seller with no rivals. Id.
73 See 345 F2d at 425,427. Although the FTC in Macaroni Manufacturers concluded with-
out explanation that standardizing macaroni products had reduced quality competition, the
Seventh Circuit's holding enjoining the practice was justified only because the standardization
tended to "ward off [buyer] price competition for durum wheat in short supply by lowering total
industry demand to the level of the available supply." Id at 426.
74 See C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co v United States, 197 F2d 489,493 (9th Cir 1952) (argu-
ing that "standardization of a product that is not naturally standardized facilitates the mainte-
nance of price uniformity"); Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute, 152 F2d at 482 (holding that the
harm of design standardization was exclusively its promotion of price uniformity). In both cases,
product standardization was enjoined because of the existence of a separate agreement to fix
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The courts in these cases were correct to hold that standardiza-
tion alone did not violate § 1. Standardization increased price compe-
tition by making previously differentiated products comparable and
reducing buyer search costs. At the same time, net competition was
not reduced because competition for tags, bottle caps, and macaroni
was primarily price-based to start with.
But standardization can support an inference of price fixing, which
does violate § 1, because standardization makes tacit coordination less
difficult.75 Similar product designs make price information "more ser-
viceable";16 in markets with differentiated products, a price cartel must
share "complex schedule[s]" of price information to operate.77 In this
way, quality standardization may increase the antitrust risk of sharing
basic price information.
However, sharing product quality information still presents less
of an antitrust risk than sharing price information. Exchanging prod-
uct quality data can be evidence of quality standardization, which can
in turn be evidence of an opportunity to fix prices easily. By contrast,
exchanging price information can be direct evidence of an opportunity
to price fix. Thus, taken as evidence of price fixing, price information
sharing cases again set a sensible outer limit for product quality infor-
mation sharing cases: where price sharing has been held legal, product
quality information sharing is presumably also legal.
2. Quality standardization can independently violate § 1 in
markets for contract terms.
Markets for nonphysical products without dominant designs, such
as markets for contract terms, have (a) limited scale economies in pro-
prices. See C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co, 197 F2d at 493; Milk and Ice Cream Can Institute, 152
F2d at 482. A similar result was reached in FTV v Cement Institute, 333 US 683 (1948). In that
case, cement manufacturers had, "in the interest of eliminating competition, suppressed informa-
tion as to the variations in quality that sometimes exist in different cements" in order to promote
product uniformity. Id at 715. Quality competition was reduced by the cartel's suppression of
information about design variation. Although price competition is typically heightened with
perfectly standardized products (see Part II.C.1, discussing why price competition is invigorated
when design is standardized), the Court found a separate agreement that also eliminated price
competition and consequently enjoined the information exchange altogether. See id at 709.
75 See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F3d 651, 656-57 (7th Cir
2002) ("[T]he product [ ] is highly standardized.... So colluding sellers would not have to agree
not only on price but also on quality, design, post-sale services, and the like.").
76 Tag Manufacturers Institute, 174 F2d at 462. Consider Rosefielde v Falcon Jet Corp, 701 F
Supp 1053, 1066 (D NJ 1988) ("[I]t is difficult to make comparisons among different models of
business jets because their characteristics vary widely.").
77 Rosefielde, 701 F Supp at 1064, quoting Department of Justice, 1984 Merger Guidelines,
online at http://www.usdoj.gov/atrlhmerger/11249.pdf (visited June 7,2006).
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duction,8 and (b) high market demand for improvements. 79 In such
markets, standardization can sometimes be anticompetitive and inde-
pendently violate § 1. Standardization reduces output by eliminating
some variants the market prefers. Meanwhile, there is no advantage to
producing only few designs because scale economies in production are
limited.s
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Paramount Famous Lasky
Corp v United States8 enjoined members of a trade association of film
distributors from standardizing exhibition contract terms.8 The stan-
dardization in question forced theaters to submit to the terms of a
standard form, a factor on which, in the Court's view, the distributors
had previously competed. 3 The Court reached the same result in
United States v First National Pictures, Inc,8' in which motion picture
distributors standardized credit requirements for theaters.85 The Court
held that this violated § 1 in part because distributors had previously
competed on credit terms. 6
Even in markets in which standardization can independently vio-
late § 1, sharing information about product quality is illegal only to the
extent that it supports the larger standardization agreement. Clearer
evidence that standardization has occurred, such as identity between
78 Contract provisions benefit from scale economies in design but not in production. That
is, reusing standard forms reduces costs because of assured legal effect. But the marginal cost of
reproduction does not change with volume; printing contract number one thousand costs as
much as printing the first contract. All products benefit from similar economies of scale in de-
sign; before marketing, no firm knows which products will generate market demand sufficient to
sustain the cost of production. By contrast, physical factors typically have scale economies in
both production and design. Both manufacturing and designing car number one thousand costs
less than manufacturing and designing the first car. Unit costs fall as the total number of cars
sold rises because fixed costs are spread over more cars.
79 The government in United States v Professional Consultants Insurance Co alleged that
market demand for alternative contract terms was eliminated by standardization of terms. See
Complaint at I 18(c) (cited in note 1) ("The use of LOL terms ... has been significantly more
prevalent than would have been the case in the presence of unrestrained competition among the
PCIC members and other actuarial consulting firms.").
80 See Lancaster, 9 Marketing Sci at 192 (cited in note 60) (concluding that "if there are no
economies of scale associated with individual product variance[,] ... then it is optimal to custom
produce to everyone's chosen specification").
81 282 US 30 (1930).
82 Idat4l,44.
83 See id at 43 (holding that collective refusal "to contract for display of pictures except
upon a standard form ... produce[s] material and unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce
in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act").
84 282 US 44 (1930). It is important to note that both First National Pictures and Para-
mount Famous Lasky were summary in nature, neither giving treatment to information sharing
case law.
85 Id at 50,54.
86 See id at 54-55 (holding that the agreement "to a standard form ... will suffice, we think,
to show the challenged arrangement conflicts with the Sherman Anti-Trust Act").
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goods made by different producers, is typically available. Meanwhile,
sharing information about product quality has procompetitive effects
that courts should take into account in any antitrust analysis.
II. COMPETITION-ENHANCING EFFECTS OF SHARING
INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT QUALITY
Sharing information about product quality can increase competi-
tion in three ways, all of which should be given weight under the rule
of reason. Part II.A examines how sharing information about product
quality invigorates price competition.8 Part II.B shows how sharing
information about product quality reduces costly price dispersion."
Part II.C discusses how sharing information about product quality can
increase competition by facilitating competitive benchmarking.
A. Invigorating Price Competition
Quality standardization invigorates price competition by making
previously differentiated products fungible.' Buyers find it easier to
compare prices between standardized products, subjecting sellers to
heightened price competition." Firms have an incentive to differenti-
ate their products in order to mute this increased price competition:92
doing so effectively grants those firms a degree of monopoly power.'
At the same time, firms have incentive to produce according to a
standard for two reasons, both of which produce net competitive gain
and are supported by the sharing of product quality information. First,
firms may standardize to take advantage of a dominant design that
accounts for most of a market's demand. 94 Second, firms may stan-
87 See Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust at 275-77 (cited in note 52) ("The few
relevant cases tend to emphasize the potential of such [product standardization] programs to
stimulate price competition by facilitating price comparison by buyers and thus support such
programs as presumptively lawful.").
88 See Posner, 67 Georgetown L J at 1188 (cited in note 24).
89 See generally Brian R. Henry, Benchmarking and Antitrust, 62 Antitrust L J 483 (1994).
Standards may also increase product quality, see Thomas R. Saving, Market Organization and
Product Quality, 48 S Econ J 855, 866 (1982) (arguing that although monopoly reduces market
output, product quality is not affected by the reduction in competition), and stimulate competi-
tion by reducing buyer search costs, see Sullivan, 45 U Pitt L Rev at 789-90 (cited in note 17).
See also Clamp-All Corp v Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute, 851 F2d 478,487 (1st Cir 1988).
90 See Sullivan, Handbook of the Law ofAntitrust at 275 (cited in note 52).
91 See id.
92 See Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization at 286 (cited in note 62) ("Firms want
to differentiate to soften price competition.").
93 See id ("If the product is differentiated[,] ... each seller has a little pocket of monopoly
power[.] ... [If], however, the product is uniform[,] ... competition would be expected to prevent
any one seller from raising his price to any of his customers above his cost.").
94 For an explanation of dominant design, see note 61.
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dardize to take advantage of positive externalities between firms.95
Information, advertising, and public research conducted by one firm
benefit other firms that produce according to the same standard.96
Sharing information about product quality supports competition in
these ways.
B. Reducing Price Dispersion
To the extent price is a function of product quality, sharing infor-
mation about product quality can reduce costly price dispersion.'
Market dispersion is inconsistent pricing between firms in the mar-
ketplace. Knowing what competitors charge for similar products facili-
tates pricing consistency and reduces price dispersion.
Minimizing price dispersion has a procompetitive effect that
should be taken into account in any rule of reason analysis.98 Because
uniform prices can be produced either by collusion or efficient mar-
kets, evidence of price uniformity only becomes significant when con-
sidered in connection with separate evidence of an agreement to fix
prices.99
Economist David Teece explains the value of minimizing price
dispersion:
Suppose a firm has the task of estimating some parameter of
great importance, such as future demand, the weather, or possibly
even the price of a key input. The statistic of interest is quite un-
certain. Each firm in the industry has some separate foundation
for estimating its value. By sharing such imperfect knowledge,
95 See Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization at 286.
96 For the same reasons that quality standardization makes price coordination easier, it
also reduces buyer search costs. Advertising becomes a public good benefiting any firm that
produces according to the standard. But advertising has an ambiguous effect on competition. It
can either increase demand elasticity by showing buyers similarities between products, or de-
crease demand elasticity by particularizing buyer preferences. See Sullivan, 45 U Pitt L Rev at
789-90 (cited in note 17).
97 Price dispersion is the variance of market prices from the efficient price. See Posner, 67
Georgetown L J at 1188 (cited in note 24) ("The purpose of a legitimate exchange of price in-
formation is to narrow the dispersion of prices-that is, to eliminate as far as possible those
prices in the tails of the price distribution that reflect the ignorance of buyers or sellers concern-
ing the conditions of supply and demand.").
98 For example, the defendants in both Maple Flooring and American Column made price
dispersion arguments, but the Court accepted the price dispersion arguments only in the former
case. See Maple Flooring, 268 US at 582-84; American Column, 257 US at 392-393.
99 Sharing product quality information brings actual prices closer to efficient prices accord-
ing to the semistrong efficient capital markets hypothesis. That hypothesis, which asserts that
prices reflect all publicly available information, has been widely accepted in federal case law. See
Basic, Inc v Levinson, 485 US 224, 241-47 (1988) (adopting the fraud-on-the-market presump-
tion, which embraces the semistrong efficient capital markets hypothesis).
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firms in an industry are likely to increase the accuracy of their
judgments.... With better estimates of uncertain common values,
operations and investments can be scheduled more confidently
and efficiently, thereby lowering long-term costs."
The benefits of reducing price dispersion manifest in various forms.
Primarily, reducing price dispersion increases allocative efficiency."'
That is to say, the closer prices are to value, the less sellers over- or un-
derinvest in production, and the less buyers over- or underpurchase.'"
Information reduces the time and difficulty firms face in setting effi-
cient prices. 3 Increased information sharing should lead to price reduc-
tions as competition forces cost savings to be passed on to consumers. '04
Information sharing is less important for reducing price disper-
sion in (a) markets selling products with a naturally uniform composi-
tion such as sugar, (b) markets where prices are regulated, 5 (c) "sta-
ble industr[ies]" with low demand variance and little innovation (as
compared with turbulent markets, which require "specialized, risky
investments"), °" and (d) concentrated markets.'" In each of these
situations, information is still required to set efficient prices. But that
information is available through historical and public channels that
lack the aspects of private communication that make conspiracy easier.
100 David J. Teece, Information Sharing, Innovation, and Antitrust, 62 Antitrust L J 465, 479
(1994).
101 See id at 467 ("[Plroducers must be well informed about competitors' prices and plans if
resources are to be allocated efficiently.").
102 See id at 479 ("Basically, cost savings are generated because overinvestment and under-
investment are minimized, and operations are better tuned to supply and demand than might
otherwise be the case.").
103 See Posner, 67 Georgetown L J at 1194 (cited in note 24):
[A firm could] pick a price at random and then observe the market response to [its] offer....
This process of trial and error would lead [the firm] gradually to the profit-maximizing price
and output, which in a competitive market would also be the socially optimal price and
output.... This blind groping for an ever-changing equilibrium may not be the most effi-
cient way to set price and output levels in a market.
See also Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v United States, 268 US 588,605 (1925):
[Alny change in quotation of price to dealers, promptly becomes well-known in the trade
through report of salesmen, agents, and dealers of various manufacturers... [U]niformity
has resulted not from maintaining the price at fixed levels, but from the prompt meeting of
changes in prices by competing sellers.
104 See Posner, 67 Georgetown L J at 1194-95 (cited in note 24). Lower costs are also con-
sidered a procompetitive factor under the rule of reason. See United States v Aluminum Co of
America, 148 F2d 416,430 (2d Cir 1945).
105 See, for example, Pevely Dairy Co v United States, 178 F2d 363, 366 (8th Cir 1949) (not-
ing that dairy product prices are fixed by government regulation).
106 See Teece, 62 Antitrust L J at 468 (cited in note 100) (demonstrating that industries with
stable demand require less information sharing to reduce price dispersion than industries with
turbulent demand).
107 See Posner, 67 Georgetown L J at 1199 (cited in note 24).
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In many situations, product quality information is available through
reverse engineering or just by looking at a product. Detailed informa-
tion sharing in such circumstances may indicate that a price cartel is in
place.'°8 But, if information about product quality is not otherwise
available, communicating with competitors becomes an important part
of the competitive process."
C. Benchmarking
Sharing information about product quality also underpins competi-
tive benchmarking. Benchmarking is an economic process in which a
company collects information about and mimics the techniques of its
superior-performing peers to enhance its own efficiency."' When an
underperforming rival uses benchmarking to improve its competitive
position, its peers are subject to enhanced price and quality competi-
tion."' The superior firm has an incentive to refine its processes fur-
ther (whether in management, manufacturing, or research and devel-
opment)."2 Information exchange enables the underperforming peer
to catch up, and the process begins again. Therefore, evidence of
benchmarking intent should support legality for product quality in-
formation sharing under the rule of reason."3
In the Matter of General Motors Corp"4 involved Toyota and
General Motors sharing price, production, advertising, and engineer-
ing information through a joint venture to design, manufacture, and
market a new car. The relevant market was highly concentrated, 15 and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that the information
sharing occasioned by the joint venture would "significantly increase
the likelihood of noncompetitive cooperation between GM and Toy-
108 See id ("[Detailed information sharing] would thus be a strong basis for an inference
that the agreement was a mask for something more sinister.").
109 Consider id at 1201 ("The consequences of not knowing at what price your competitor is
going to sell his product are serious in a market in which each sale is a large fraction of one's
annual business.").
n0 See Teece, 62 Antitrust L J at 477 (cited in note 100). Also see generally Henry, 62 Anti-
trust L J 483 (cited in note 89).
111 See Teece, 62 Antitrust L J at 477 (cited in note 100) ("Benchmarking, by bringing in
external information to the firm, ... galvaniz[es] companies to compete once they recognize how
far behind they are and what they can do to improve.").
112 See id at 478 ("Sharing information of one's own successes may lead to the receipt of
information from other firms concerning their successes.").
113 See id ("[Wiere agencies and third parties to litigate over information exchange in bona
fide benchmarking programs, it would have its own long run anticompetitive effects, throttling
down one of the major forces of organizational renewal currently at work in America.").
114 103 FTC 374 (1984).
1'5 See id at 375.
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ota, the effect of which may be substantially to lessen competition."''
The FTC enjoined the sharing of information unrelated to the opera-
tion of the joint venture."7 But the joint venture itself, along with the
significant level of information exchange necessary for its operation,
was upheld. One FTC Chairman explained:
[T]he joint venture offers a valuable opportunity for GM to
complete its learning of more efficient Japanese manufacturing
and management techniques. Moreover, to the extent the [ ] ven-
ture demonstrates the Japanese system can be successfully
adapted to the United States, the venture should lead to the de-
velopment of a more efficient and competitive U.S. industry."'
There was general agreement among the Commissioners that bench-
marking would produce significant procompetitive effects. "9
Courts, like the FTC, seem to agree regarding the procompetitive
benefits of benchmarking. For example, in Virginia Academy of Clini-
cal Psychologists v Blue Shield of Virginia,12° psychologists sued several
managed care companies alleging that standardizing terms of service
so as to require doctor supervision of psychological services vio-
lated § 1.121 In setting its policy, one managed care company consulted
closely with peers as to (a) "who should be paid for providing mental
health care," (b) "how much they should be paid," (c) "when they
should be paid," and (d) "for what they should be paid."' That firm
benchmarked an effective billing policy from its peers. The peer firms
then had increased incentive to distinguish themselves by improving
quality or lowering price. The district court held, and the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed, that § 1 "does not prohibit a business entity which needs
information and advice from obtaining information and advice from
other knowledgeable business entities. The operation of a medical
insurance plan would be, for all practical purposes, impossible if con-
sultation and cooperation with provider groups were barred. 3
116 Id at 376.
117 See id at 384.
118 Id at 387-88 (Statement of Chairman James C. Miller III).
119 See id at 397 (Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Patricia P. Bailey) (noting that
"hands-on experience with Japanese management techniques" would help GM "produce a
cheaper car").
120 469 F Supp 552 (ED Va 1979), affd in part, vacd and remd in part, 624 F2d 476 (4th Cir
1980).
121 469 F Supp at 555.
122 Id at 558.
123 Id at 559. The Fourth Circuit held that among the three alleged conspirators, two Blue
Shield providers actually agreed to fix policy terms constituting a collective boycott in violation
of § 1, but that the third provider did not: the "decision as to the Blue Shield Plan does not affect
the Neuropsychiatric Society of Virginia" because "there was no conspiracy between the two
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The Supreme Court considered benchmarking a procompetitive
reason for sharing product quality information in United States v Citi-
zens and Southern National Bank.'24 In that case, the Court upheld a
large urban bank's sharing of price and service information with sev-
eral smaller suburban banks. No agreement had formed between the
institutions" and the Court held that the smaller banks' study of the
larger bank's practices increased competition because, by having ac-
cess to "expert advice[] and proved banking services, branches of sev-
eral city banks can often enter a market not yet large or developed
enough to support a variety of independent, unit banks."'6
III. EVIDENCE POLICY SUPPORTS AN IRREBUTIABLE
PRESUMPTION OF LEGALITY
This Part argues for an irrebuttable presumption of § 1 legality
for product quality information sharing. An irrebuttable presumption
in this context would economize on judicial decision costs while al-
most always reaching the correct result.
Evidence scholars have noted that "a legal system's choice among
[ ] standards [of proof] is an exercise in trading off the harms that flow
from different types of error.' ' 27 The expected cost of erroneously en-
joining procompetitive information sharing is extremely high. As dis-
cussed in this Comment and widely acknowledged by economists, in-
formation sharing is an essential ingredient in the process of competi-
tion." Meanwhile, the expected cost of precluding use of information
groups." "It was not illegal for NSV ... to make recommendations aimed at persuading Blue
Shield to adopt its proposal and use its services, absent some form of coercion." Virginia Acad-
emy of Clinical Psychologists, 624 F2d at 483. Thus the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
holding that § 1 "does not prohibit a business entity which needs information and advice from
obtaining information and advice from other knowledgeable business entities." Id at 479.
124 422 US 86 (1975).
125 Id at 114.
126 Id at 112. The circumstances were slightly more complex, but largely immaterial in con-
sidering the legal status of benchmarking. City banks held 5 percent of suburban banks, waiting
for a state statute to pass allowing them to purchase the remaining equity. The statute was passed,
but the acquisitions spawned this antitrust prosecution. See id at 89-90. For another example of
benchmarking justifications for sharing information about product quality, see Rosefielde, 701 F
Supp at 1053 ("[T]he Meyer and Tuck surveys were commenced because of unfamiliarity with
competitors' policies.").
127 Schauer and Zeckhauser, 25 J Legal Stud at 34 (cited in note 12):
[For example,] as long as a wrongful deprivation of liberty is more harmful than nonpun-
ishment of those who deserve it, any version of Blackstone's maxim will generate some-
thing close to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, the preponder-
ance standard used in most civil litigation reflects the view that a failure to find for a de-
serving plaintiff is no less harmful than holding liable a nonculpable defendant.
128 Economist David Teece argues that information sharing benefits include (a) enhancing
allocative efficiency, Teece, 62 Antitrust L J at 467-68 (cited in note 100); (b) increasing industrial
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sharing, even as evidence of an underlying output cartel, is minor. In-
formation sharing as evidence of an agreement setting output is highly
circumstantial. Better evidence is frequently available; agreements
characteristically have mutual monitoring, enforcement mechanisms,
and non-self-interested firm behavior.129 Avoiding the more costly of
these two types of error justifies presuming legality from the beginning.
Courts already perform this analysis, trading off error costs, to
some extent, when adjudicating preliminary injunctions. As with pre-
liminary injunctions, judicial decisions in antitrust information sharing
cases are often made under factually ambiguous circumstances. More-
over, antitrust remedies very often use injunctions. The standard for
issuing a preliminary injunction includes four parts. The party seeking
the injunction must demonstrate (a) that there is a strong likelihood
of success on the merits,13 (b) that irreparable harm will occur without
the injunction,131 (c) that the balance of hardships strongly favors in-
junction, "2 and (d) that injunction will serve the public interest."' The
lack of anticompetitive certainty in antitrust information sharing cases
undermines each of these criteria respectively by failing to show (a)
probable anticompetitive effects, (b) irreparable harm without injunc-
tion, (c) greater harm to consumer welfare from continued informa-
tion sharing than from injunction, and (d) whether injunction or con-
tinued information sharing better serves the public interest.
Adjudicating the § 1 legality of information sharing involves
separating the procompetitive from the anticompetitive case. Situa-
tions like this, in which courts must distinguish liability from nonliabil-
ity rather than only the extent of liability, support a presumption of
nonliability." In an analogous discussion from the criminal law con-
text, Professor Schauer explained:
Where innocence is truly innocent,.., it may be appropriate to
employ a higher burden of proof than where innocence is com-
patible with "not quite guilty," as in many cases that do not involve
innovation, id at 468-69; (c) increasing industrial organization, id at 469-70; (d) forming "indus-
trial clusters," id at 469-73; (e) establishing dominant standards, id at 473-77; (f) benchmarking,
id at 477-78; (g) supporting common industry values, id at 478-79; and (h) identifying industry-
wide objectives to align resources, id at 479-80.
129 See notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
130 See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, 11A Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2948.3 (West 3d ed 1998 & Supp 2004).
131 Id at § 2948.1.
132 Id at § 2948.2.
133 Id at § 2948.4.
134 See Schauer and Zeckhauser,25 J Legal Stud at 36 (cited in note 12).
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questions of identity but only how close the defendant's conduct
was to the border between the culpable and the nonculpable"'
Here, the distinction is not between degree of anticompetitive harm,
but rather anticompetitive conduct and competitively essential con-
duct. Anticompetitive and procompetitive information sharing may
appear indistinguishable. And while the former is the precise behavior
§ 1 was designed to enjoin, the latter is the precise behavior the anti-
trust laws were designed to protect. A presumption of legality for
product quality information sharing would draw a bright line for busi-
nesses and reduce chilling effects near the border of § 1.136
An irrebuttable presumption of legality also bears a close anal-
ogy to existing presumptions courts use in antitrust. As a market grows
more concentrated, competitors increasingly set prices in response to
one another and independent but parallel actions can sometimes ap-
pear indistinguishable from cartel behavior. Thus, to avoid enjoining
procompetitive actions courts have held that the inference of cartel
pricing must be more likely than one of interdependent pricing for a
conspiracy to be found. 37
IV. THE PROFESSIONAL CONSULTANTS INSURANCE COMPANY CASE
This synthesis of existing legal and economic literature sheds light
on the consent decree between the Government and PCIC. This Part
argues that the Antitrust Division's allegation that PCIC violated § 1
by sharing information about insurance products was incorrect. Well-
established case law dealing with the exchange of price information
sets an outer limit for the § 1 legality of sharing information about
product quality. Those cases make clear that information sharing is
135 Id.
136 Consider United States v United States Gypsum Co, 438 US 422,441 (1978):
The imposition of criminal liability on a corporate official, or for that matter on a corpora-
tion directly, for engaging in such conduct which only after the fact is determined to violate
the statute because of anticompetitive effects, without inquiring into the intent with which it
was undertaken, holds out the distinct possibility of overdeterrence."
137 See Rosefielde v Falcon Jet Corp, 701 F Supp 1053,1062 (D NJ 1988) (stating that "the
plaintiffs must show 'the inference of rational, independent choice [is] less attractive than that of
concerted action') (alteration in original), quoting Bogosian v Gulf Oil Corp, 561 F2d 434, 446
(3d Cir 1977). In Rosefielde, the plaintiff alleged in part that the defendant trade association
members conspired to fix contractual terms of sale. See 701 F Supp at 1073. The court rejected
this claim, reasoning that "although [the members] all adopted [such] policies[,] ... inferences of
conspiracy made from ... consciously parallel business behavior cannot be made without the
existence of certain 'plus factors."' Id at 1074, quoting Apex Oil Co v DiMauro, 822 F2d 246, 253
(2d Cir 1987).
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never an independent violation of § 1.138 Therefore, a court assessing
the merits would have been forced to dismiss the Complaint for fail-
ure "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."'3 9 However,
although the legal allegations contained in the Complaint are notably
incorrect, consent decrees do not issue rules of law." The PCIC De-
cree is thus consistent with existing cases to the extent that it only en-
joins sharing information about product quality, otherwise legal, as a
prophylactic measure to "ensure that the violation will cease and
competition will be restored."'' 1
The Government could have readily modified the Complaint to
allege instead that PCIC violated § 1, not by sharing information, but
by agreeing with competitors to standardize products.' 2 Although that
charge is plausible, the existing Complaint does not support such a
theory. The market for actuarial insurance contracts may have been
characterized by significant product quality competition as to limita-
tion of liability before the standardization. But, it is hard to imagine
why PCIC would choose an anticompetitive level of product quality
when its own equity holders would have exclusively borne the result-
ing harm.'" Even if the standardization reduced quality competition, it
should have generated other procompetitive effects. First, without a
separate allegation that prices were fixed, a court should have assumed
138 See generally Maple Flooring, 268 US 563 (holding that sharing price information does
not violate § 1).
139 See FRCP 12(b)(6).
140 See Beatrice Foods v FTC, 540 F2d 303, 312 (7th Cir 1976) (holding that a consent de-
cree "is not a decision on the merits and therefore does not adjudicate the legality of any action
by a party thereto").
141 Toys "R" Us Inc v FTC, 221 F3d 928,940 (7th Cir 2000).
142 The nature of the information sharing allegation suggested that the competitors had also
formed a tacit agreement to standardize product quality: "The PCIC official advises that 'a
strong argument can be made that it is not in any firms' individual best interest to avoid imple-
menting reasonable contractual safeguards."' Complaint at I 16(a)-(d) (cited in note 1). Para-
mount Famous Lasky and First National Pictures can be distinguished from the PCIC case in this
sense because those cases dealt with a standardization claim, not an information sharing claim.
143 As in Paramount Famous Lasky and First National Pictures, evidence from the PCIC
case indicated that there was substantial market demand for a variety of liability provisions. The
Government alleged: "The use of LOL terms ... has been significantly more prevalent than
would have been the case in the presence of unrestrained competition among the PCIC mem-
bers and other actuarial consulting firms." Complaint at I 18(c) (cited in note 1). At the same
time, contract terms do not have economies of scale in production.
144 See Complaint at 2 (cited in note 1) (stating that PCIC is owned by three actuarial
companies who are also its exclusive clients). Because the market was extremely concentrated, it
is plausible that procompetitive effects from the standardization were muted. Increased price
competition from standardization may have been offset by interdependent pricing, and prices
may not have been dispersed before the standardization because each competitor may have
been well informed about the other firms' prices and products. But the Antitrust Division failed
to allege any of these facts. From the facts alleged in the Complaint, the standardization in the
PCIC case appears procompetitive.
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that standardization increased price competition.'45 Second, standardiz-
ing liability terms may have reduced socially costly price dispersion by
helping firms calibrate new efficient prices after the recent large indus-
try-wide insurance recoveries." Third, if one firm discovered an effec-
tive way to limit liability (after the recent unexpected recoveries)
while adhering to buyer preferences, allowing other firms to bench-
mark that technique would increase, not decrease, competitive incen-
tives.'47
Even if PCIC violated § 1 by standardizing terms, information
sharing is relatively weak evidence when compared with other facts
probably available, such as competitor adoption of identical contract
terms. Given the procompetitive justifications for sharing information
about product quality, any court hearing this case on the merits should
have been cautious about considering information sharing even as
evidence of anticompetitive standardization.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust laws regulate observable behaviors that signal deeper
economic machinations themselves impractical for courts to inspect.
As a matter of law, information sharing, without more, does not vio-
late § 1 of the Sherman Act. However, information sharing may facili-
tate both competitive and anticompetitive ends. In evaluating its legal-
ity as a precursor act, courts are ill-equipped to make fine distinctions
between the anticompetitive and procompetitive case. The cost is
greater for erroneously enjoining vital procompetitive behavior than
for not considering information sharing as evidence of cartel action.
Given all of this, courts hearing cases involving sharing information
about product quality should exclude that behavior from their larger
antitrust inquiry.
145 See Part II.A.
146 See Complaint at 1 9 (cited in note 1).
147 PCIC and its competitors performed behavior consistent with benchmarking. See id at
I 15(c) (noting that "a senior official of one of the non-PCIC competitors" had "as part of the
firm's consideration of LOL, requested and received from a PCIC official sample LOL language
to help the firm develop LOL terms for its own client contracts").
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